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We should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so 
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing 
purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Abrahams v. United States, 250 US 630 (1919) 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications 
(REBSP) sets out the dilemma between scientific progress and social stability. 
This dilemma means wishing, on the one hand, improvement of scientific 
knowledge and new technological applications, and, on the other hand, stability 
in our moral and political representation of the society. Both ideas are desirable 
but sometimes cannot be confirmed at the same time. In this sense, the 
relationship between scientific progress and social stability is not always seen 
as peaceful because the first seeks change and the second seeks preservation. 
Knowledge improvement, scientific innovations and technological applications 
are not always evaluated as factors of social progress but they are sometimes 
seen as dangerous for social stability and social identity, subversive factors for 
the political, religious or economic order. From time to time, cases arise of 
societies with problems due to the increasing number of information channels. 
The advent of new technologies and the increasing demand for information 
have always given a great impetus to social advancement. For this reason, 
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some governments suggest that people cannot have a right to seek, receive or 
impart a certain kind of information through a certain sort of channels. 
 
In fact, the right to seek, receive or impart information can have both a positive 
and a negative impact on society because the seeked, received and imparted 
information is not only the information which serves a public interest but also the 
information related only to a private interest. If we have a look at the Internet, 
the increasing number of information channels affects political and educational 
issues, which contributes to economical development, a far-reaching 
democratic reform or an educational improvement. The UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression has asserted that the Internet will be «an increasingly important 
human rights education tool (...) the global reach and relative ease of use of the 
Internet makes it a unique and highly effective tool for the promotion of human 
rights, enabling an unprecedented audience previously unfamiliar with human 
rights education to gain access to valuable information» (2001, para. 13-14). 
But the Internet also affects the less enlightened issues and information, 
creating a new instrument for the violation of human rights because of intrusive 
collection of data, detection of tracking behaviour and promotion of false images 
and negative stereotypes of vulnerable individuals or groups, and because of 
the use of information for purposes contrary to respect for human rights, in 
particular the perpetration of violence against and exploitation and abuse of 
women and children and the dissemination of racist and xenophobic discourse 
or content. The Internet can have, furthermore, «a terrific impact on the quantity 
and quality of information at disposal of the most disadvantaged classes, 
especially the rural poor» (Report, 2005, para. 30).  
 
In this paper, however, I am not going to show the shadows of the scientific 
progress related to the freedom of information but only the lights, underlining 
the utopian spirit of the idea of the full execution of the right to seek, receive and 
impart information due to the scientific progress and its technological 
applications, or, as William Schabas suggests, «an opportunity to propose and 
develop a content of the norm that is consistent with the realities of the human 
condition at the dawn of the twenty-first century». 
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The REBSP is enshrined in article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and in article 15.1.b of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). This right is an important challenge for the 
general theory on human rights since it is necessary, first, to elucidate its 
normative nature and content; second, to discuss the interdependence and 
interrelation with others human rights (in my case, with the right to seek, receive 
and impart information which is recognized in article 19 UDHR and article 19.2 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and, third, to 
establish a non-discriminatory implementation. Based on these issues, this 
paper is divided into three epigraphs. The first epigraph is devoted to set up the 
normative nature and content of the REBSP through the theory of the 
generations of human rights, and the second and the third epigraphs are 
devoted to the interdependence and interrelation with the right to seek, receive 
and impart information. 
 
The right to seek, receive and impart information is being presented and 
analyzed in relation to the use of the internet, since it represents one of the 
most important means of communication, which has also affected the 
development and use of other means such as newspapers, television, radio etc.  
 
2. The REBSP: what normative nature? What generation? 
The history of human rights is usually divided into synchronic (?) generations 
through which it is possible to see how human rights have been the subject of a 
political debate and a legal recognition since the XVIII century bourgeoisie 
revolutions. The generations of human rights allow us to observe the ideological 
changes because this theory illustrates how the major categories of human 
rights emerged in political philosophy (Nowak, 2001, 252). It is a commonplace 
for most of the scholars to consider the movement from the XVIII and XIX 
centuries from liberal political thought to the turn-of-the-century transversal 
social movements as feminism or deep ecology, through the socialist and 
democratic thought. The generations do not only explain the transformation 
human rights have had since the rise of the liberal state until the consolidation 
of the welfare state but also the normative content. As María Eugenia 
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Rodríguez Palop suggests, talking about generations is useful when trying to 
study the rights explaining their connection with the context but also when trying 
to see the normative nature and the common features of the rights (2002, 72). 
 
If we take into account both the normative structure of the rights and the 
ideological influences, the first generation is for the civil rights; the second 
generation, political rights; the third generation, economic, social and cultural 
rights; and the fourth is for a new category of rights of which the normative 
content and rightholders are diffused1. Each generation must be understood as 
a supplement for the previous one since, as J.M. Lavielle says, the appearance 
of new generations of rights does not mean that rights from previous 
generations are old rights which have to be marginalized but quite the opposite 
because generations of rights reinforce each other (1990, 221). Each new 
generation is influenced by the previous because it has been taken into 
consideration in order to complete and correct its deficiencies and mistakes 
(Pérez Luño, 1987, 56). In this sense, we can affirm that the different 
generations of human rights are interdependent, interrelated and indivisible 
(Eide & Rosas, 2001, 3)2 and the theory of the generations does not, of course, 
                                                 
1
 The number of generations is contested. Some scholars stand at three (Vasak, 1982) and 
some scholars stand at four (Bobbio, 1991). In my opinion, according to Norberto Bobbio’s 
thesis, civil and political rights cannot form a group because they implement a different kind of 
freedom. Civil rights implement freedom as no interference and political rights implement 
freedom as participation (1991, 70). It is true that in the first declarations of rights there are 
some references to the right to vote but the vindication of the political participation rights 
appeared in a different historical context. In this sense, it is necessary to distinguish between 
civil and political rights, since the political rights were accepted as human rights much later than 
some of the civil rights, in some countries even later than economic and social rights. Against 
the idea of generations it is said that «the history of the evolution of human rights at the national 
level does not make it possible to place the emergence of different human rights into clear-cut 
stages» (Eide & Rosas, 2001, 4). In the same sense, some participants on the seminar 
contested the usefulness of the distinction between generations because they argued that such 
a distinction might impede the implementation of some rights. In my opinion, the theory of the 
generations of the human rights and the interdependence among them are useful tools in order 
to set up the normative nature of the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
applications, though we have to realize that maybe the different generations of human rights are 
more useful in theory for explaining history, ideological influences, founding values and 
normative nature than in practice for the fulfilment of some rights. 
2
 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), para. 5. 
Concerning the legal expression, the rights of the different generations have been recognised in 
the main legal texts. Limiting our scope to the universal system of protection for human rights, 
two texts can be highlighted: ICCPR and ICESCR. Although the UDHR is the standard of 
reference in the development of national and international human right norms because it 
comprises in one consolidated text nearly the entire range of what today are recognized as 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, ICCPR and ICESCR expand and define its terms and 
establish legal obligations to which States may bind themselves. As Matthew Craven says, «as 
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imply any hierarchy or a exhaustive list of rights because the history of human 
rights cannot be considered as completed since there will always be new 
vindications by politically excluded groups. 
 
The interdependence and interrelation among the different generations of 
human rights is a suitable instrument for the maximum level of protection of 
human dignity (Alston, 1993). In this sense, we should abandon two ideas: first, 
economic, social and cultural rights and fourth generation rights are not 
justiciable because among their protection clauses the direct demand on court 
and the individual petition with respect to violations are excluded; second, these 
rights are expensive and welfare states have financial problems to put them into 
practice. Although we have to be aware of both the existence of different 
system for protection and of the welfare state’s crisis, it is not possible to 
disregard any of the human rights generations. Apart from the utilitarian 
approach that sees the third and fourth human rights generations as essential 
conditions for the full enjoyment of civil and political rights, there is a more 
comprehensive form of justification that views them «as inherently valuable 
considerations irrespective of what they contribute to the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights (...) such rights may be considered universal human rights in so 
far as they relate to fundamental elements of the individual’s physical nature, 
whether that be physical needs or their ability to enjoy social goods» (Craven, 
1995, 13). On the other hand, the fact that certain rights are contingent for their 
implementation upon the existence of sufficient resources, is not a categorical 
argument because it would be wrong to suggest that civil and political rights 
themselves are entirely free of cost. 
 
The normative nature of the REBSP is one of the main problems we have to 
face. Is the REBSP and its applications a true right? This is a preliminary 
question and the answer is quite important because it might be possible that the 
                                                                                                                                               
the Covenants have gained broader acceptance in the international community and as their 
respective acceptance supervisory systems have been developed, they have begun to figure 
more largely in the international protection of human rights» (1995, 7). The duality civil-political 
rights vs. social-economic-cultural rights is being overcome step by step because in more recent 
global instruments, the sets of rights have been integrated in some common text. However, 
although within the UN there is now almost universal acceptance of the theoretical ‘indivisible 
and interdependent’ nature of the sets of rights, the reality in practice is that economic, social, 
and cultural rights and fourth generation of rights remain largely ignored (Craven, 1995, 9). 
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scientific progress was only a qualifying instrument for the fulfilment of other 
rights, including the right to seek, receive and impart information. 
 
The first option, when shaping the normative nature of the REBSP, is to 
consider it as a droit quotidien (daily right). This kind of rights, according to 
María Eugenia Rodríguez Palop, are identified with a sort of powers that 
citizens have for the realization of their rights (2002, 29). Daily rights are linked 
to the appearance of new instruments for fulfilling old necessities. So, the right 
to seek, receive and impart information is the old necessity which would benefit 
from the appearance and development of the Internet. This option defended by 
François Luchaire (1987) means that the REBSP is not a right but only an 
instrument. Although the main purpose and last consequence will be the 
enlargement of the democratic horizon, daily rights cannot be considered as 
‘new rights’ emerging from a mutation both of the social circumstances and the 
axiological system. They have to be seen as effective instruments for the 
exercise of legally recognized rights and freedoms (Rodríguez Palop, 2002, 30). 
 
In my opinion, the REBSP is not one of these daily rights because the Internet 
cannot be seen as a simple instrument for improving the right to seek, receive 
and impart information. The Internet has caused a radical transformation of the 
social context both in Northern and Southern countries. Some social 
movements have emerged playing a global role and denouncing the 
deficiencies of the political and economic system both at the local and global 
level, demanding a fair distribution of the benefits of scientific progress and 
technological application in order to get a better society. In the XXI century, the 
information society is the fruit of the global development of communication 
technologies, especially the Internet, and in this new social structure the 
elements of the equation (information, knowledge and wealth) are equivalent, 
widening the gap between Northern and Southern countries. 
 
The second option is to consider it as a third generation right. In my opinion, 
despite the fact that the REBSP is recognized in ICESCR, it is not an economic, 
social and cultural right for three main reasons: (i) the exercise is not allotted to 
specific people, (ii) it does not develop the material sense equality and (iii) the 
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rightholders do not have a different legal status. The specification of the 
rightholders means that though all economic, social and cultural rights are 
universal, in the sense that they apply (at least potentially) to everyone, the 
exercise of those rights is related to the particular circumstances in which 
individuals find themselves. Economic, social and cultural rights are not allotted 
to abstract human beings because the human condition is not good enough to 
exercise them, as is the case with civil and political rights. Economic, social and 
cultural rights should only be enjoyed by the most disadvantaged people to be 
competitive and to be able to live in society (Peces-Barba, 1999, 64). The 
development of the material sense of equality or equality as differentiation is 
linked to the specification of the rightholder since economic, social and cultural 
rights start from a de facto discrimination in life (Peces-Barba, 1999, 64). 
Economic, social and cultural rights do not implement commutative justice but 
distributive justice because they start from the existing differences in society. 
They give an unequal treatment to unequal human beings according to the 
diversity of personal situations (Bobbio, 1994, 20-21). Economic, social and 
cultural rights show us that some groups are more vulnerable than others or 
have traditionally been discriminated or excluded (women, children, migrant 
workers, sexual minorities, indigenous peoples...) and they may require special 
protection of their rights, sometimes through the adoption of a different legal 
status such as affirmative action or other special measures. 
 
The third option is to consider it as a diffuse right, that is, as a fourth generation 
right. As I will explain, this is the option I prefer. Fourth generation rights come 
up from the generated exigencies by the technological development. They try to 
protect some collective interests and they are based on the value of solidarity 
(fraternité) between Northern and Southern countries. The REBSP is a fourth 
generation right because the full implementation will make the democratic 
structure of the society more dynamic, thus helping the participation of the 
citizens in the management and resolution of social problems and redistributing 
the political power. The REBSP will cause a radical change in the political and 
economic order both at the local and global level. The vindication of the REBSP 
questions the way in which the states have been answering the new challenges 
and problems that the welfare of the citizens sets. This right claims an 
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enlargement of the democratic horizon; a higher level of participation and 
political and economic decentralization; a change in the international politics 
based on a comprehensive plan of decolonization and peaceful and equitable 
political relation among the states; a social and environmental responsible and 
peaceful use of science and technologies; and the securing of a sustainable 
and fair development. 
 
If we try to answer who is the subject and what is the object of the REBSP, it is 
necessary to realize there is a slow academic and legal process in clarifying 
these issues and their corresponding obligations. In my opinion, the rightholder 
is a universal and abstract subject who cannot be specified as in economic, 
social and cultural rights, though it has to be said that the exercise of the right is 
collective because we are protecting communal interests. So, when we refer to 
these rights a collective approach is often called, since they can only be 
enjoyed by individuals in community. That is, there is an individual rightholder 
but the right is implemented by a collective effort. This kind of rightholding is 
demanding the reinforcement of the responsibility of the international 
community and the presence of individual subjects at the international level, and 
an increment and expansion of citizens’ participation at the local level 
(Rodríguez Palop, 2002, 141). 
 
The objects of protection are collective interests since through this vindication 
we are trying to articulate a way to enjoy some collective goods (Rodríguez 
Palop, 2002, 130). After that, one of the main issues we have to resolve is the 
definition of such collective interests within pluralistic and multicultural societies. 
This definition process, certainly, drives us to an ideal community of dialogue in 
which a rational consensus is set up and the specific context of the individuals 
is surpassed. This process means that we need a new public sphere. This new 
public sphere is a deliberative space where the common-wealth is articulated 
and the differences are discussed. It will cause a renovation of the political 
culture in the long term, a reformulation of our social responsibility and of the 
democratic praxis (Innerarity, 2006, 14-15). Such rational consensus and public 
sphere will be only possible if people are capable, first, to interact leaving aside 
their individual and strategic interests; second, to denounce those actions that 
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put life on earth in danger or promote exclusion, exploitation and 
marginalization of millions of human beings; and, third, to articulate a new and 
wider dimension of the moral and legal responsibilities (Rodríguez Palop, 2002, 
146). 
 
Regarding the duties of the State in recognizing, protecting and developing the 
REBSP, one notes that this right is related to goals, policies and programmes. 
So, we have to admit it is necessary to set up systems of legal protection much 
more ductile and flexible. However, as Asbjørn Eide and Allan Rosas have said, 
«it [is] essential that the concept of right is included in such goals and 
programmes» because «fundamental needs should not be at the mercy of 
changing governmental policies and programmes, but should be defined as 
entitlements» (2001, 6), which ensure an adequate standard of living and  
judicial protection in order to be invoked in courts of law and applied by judges. 
Rights require the existence of some duty-holders, and the primary 
responsibility for the realization of human rights rests within the State. Under 
international law, duties for human rights (respect, contribute, assist, provide, 
achieve, protect, fulfil, facilitate, provide) are primarily held by States though, 
subsidiary, some people and public institutions can be obliged and, in some 
cases, the obligation could even be universal because, when it comes to know 
what resources are available to the State in order to fulfil the rights, «the 
question is not what resources are in the hands of the government as compared 
to privately owned resources but on the total resources of the country as a 
whole» (Eide, 2001, 27). 
 
3. The REBSP as interrelated and interdependent with the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information through the Internet. 
Regarding the interdependence and interrelation between the REBSP and the 
right to seek, receive and impart information, it is a good idea to pose such 
relation from the point of view of a political theory that concedes a preponderant 
role to dialogue, democracy and political participation rights as cornerstones of 
the social system. In my opinion, the right to seek, receive and impart 
information because of the technological advances, mainly the Internet, may 
have a substantial contribution in the attainment of a free society protecting 
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information pluralism and free access to information and ideas3. The exercise of 
the right to freedom of expression, particularly by the media, including through 
information and communication technologies such as the Internet, can have a 
positive contribution while fighting against racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, and preventing human rights abuses. The 
free flow of information also allows us to hear the voices of the excluded whose 
rights have been traditionally violated (Report, 2001, para. 6). We could say that 
if the freedom of information through the Internet is protected and promoted by 
the states, we might be able to reverse the current social situation (Castells, 
1998). This interrelation between the REBSP and the freedom of information 
will shape a more dynamic democratic structure of the society, thus helping the 
participation of the citizens in the management and resolution of social 
problems, redistributing the political power and expanding the democratic 
horizon. 
 
The freedom to seek, receive and impart information through the Internet, from 
a subjective point of view, protects autonomy because it is one of the rights 
human beings have in order to face groups of power, public or private, that 
might manipulate, monopolize and censure information or limit the access to 
information. This presupposes a political liberation for people, unchaining them 
from uncritical adherence to theories or ideologies and allowing them to use 
whatever information or opinion are available from a variety of sources. From an 
objective point of view, this right is «a fundamental and inalienable right that 
contributes to the consolidation and the development of democracy, in addition 
to creating bridges between different peoples and civilizations» (Report, 2005, 
para. 49). The exercise of the right to freedom of opinion and expression is one 
of the foundations of any democratic society; it is enabled by a democratic 
environment which, inter alia, offers guarantees for its protection; it is essential 
to the full and effective participation in a free and democratic society; it is 
instrumental to the development and strengthening of effective democratic 
systems; and it is an important indicator of the level of protection of other 
                                                 
3
 Mobile phones, in particular, and the global communications network, broadly speaking, have 
brought benefits in this topic as we have been able to see when Myanmar’s monks marched in 
defiance of the military junta. The information was spread all around the world sending 
photographs and videos using mobile phones. 
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human rights and freedoms. In this sense, freedom of expression is not only a 
limit for protecting citizens from the interferences of the state but also a 
fundamental principle in any democratic society (Ryssdal, 1997, 60)4. 
 
This essential role of the freedom of expression justifies both an abstentionist 
and promotional attitude by the state. Democratic institutions offer guarantees 
for its protection as well as an enabling environment for its exercise and 
promotion. In this sense, the UN Special Rapporteur encouraged governments 
«to ensure that the exercise of the freedom of opinion and expression through 
the media is open and accessible to various actors of the civil society, local 
communities and minorities, vulnerable groups, in addition to economic and 
political groups» (Report, 2004, para. 85). So, we have to overcome the 
traditional thesis on the abstentionist attitude of the state with the civil and 
political rights because these rights also need a promotional attitude in order to 
create the conditions for people to benefit  from the freedom of expression and 
the exchange of information and ideas (Cohen-Jonathan, 1989, 459)5. 
 
The freedom to seek, receive and impart information is included in article 19.2  
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as a content 
of the right to freedom of expression. We can read there that «everyone shall 
have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media 
                                                 
4
 ECHR, Handyside, 1976, para. 49, declares that freedom of expression is one of the 
cornerstones of any democratic society and a necessary condition in order to achieve human 
and social progress. States must protect those controversial ideas and information within 
society. UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Information has stated that 
«several governments, with the active support of some transnational corporations working in 
this field, have closely been monitoring the web in order to identify and stop various forms of 
opposition and criticism. Ordinary citizens have been arrested or harassed by authorities only 
because they dared express their opinion through an e-mail or through the reading of a 
website» (Report, 2007, para. 11). See ECHR, Karakoç, 2002, para. 43: «La Cour ne sous-
estime pas les difficultés liées à la lutte contre le terrorisme. Toutefois, elle observe que les 
requérants s’exprimaient en leur qualité de dirigeants syndicaux et de représentant de la 
presse, dans le cadre de leur rôle d’acteur de la vie politique turque, n’incitant ni à l’usage de la 
violence ni à la résistance armée ni au soulèvement (...) Au contraire, ils assumaient leur rôle 
important d’alerte de l’opinion publique concernant des actes concrets pouvant porter atteinte 
aux droits fondamentaux». See also in senso contrario, ECHR, Zana, 1997, para. 53-54; Sürek 
I, 1999, para. 62-65; Sürek III, 1999, para. 40-42. 
5
 ECHR, Informationsverein Lentia, 1993, para. 38, declares that States are guarantors of the 
freedom of information and must promote the creation of media. 
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of his choice»6. Freedom of expression is then a plural freedom because it 
includes freedom of information and freedom of opinion. The difference 
between them is what is transmitted (the message): facts or opinions7. Both 
freedoms share the right to communicate and receive but only the freedom of 
information includes the right to research (Català, 2001, 97-98). However, it is 
necessary to notice that it is very difficult to find a pure exposition because facts 
and opinions are usually mixed8. 
 
Limiting the scope to the freedom of information, it covers the right to impart 
facts, news and information which must be truthful9. This requirement makes 
freedom of information closely related to the right of research. As Alexandre 
Català says, if the freedom of research is not covered by the freedom of 
                                                 
6
 ICCPR article is more extensive than UDHR article since it includes the right to seek and 
receive information. 
7
 ECHR, Lingens, 1986, para. 46, states the difference between freedom of opinion and 
freedom of information: «In the Court’s view, a careful distinction needs to be made between 
facts and value-judgments. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of 
value-judgments is not susceptible of proof». Opinions, then, are not bound by truthfulness 
criteria. In this sense, ECHR, Monnat, 2006, para. 56-57: «the report was not presenting an 
indisputable truth but rather one possible interpretation of relations between Switzerland and 
Germany. The Court reiterates that it is an integral part of freedom of expression to seek 
historical truth, but considers that it is not called upon to settle the issue of the role actually 
played by Switzerland in the Second World War, which is part of an ongoing debate among 
historians». 
8
 ECHR, Oberschilck, 1991, para. 63, ECHR, De Haes, 1997, para. 47, ECHR, Jerusalem, 
2001, para. 43, ECHR, Brasilier, 2006, para. 36, state that in some cases it is necessary to 
make a preponderant judgment between facts and opinions: «La Cour rappelle également que, 
même lorsqu’une déclaration équivaut à un jugement de valeur, la proportionnalité de 
l’ingérence dépend de l’existence d’une base factuelle pour la déclaration incriminée puisque 
même un jugement de valeur totalement dépourvu de base factuelle peut se révéler excessif». 
(In French only) 
9
 The truthfulness principle demands a strong inquiry of the facts (Català, 2001, 107). See 
ECHR, Goodwin, 1996, para. 39; ECHR, Fressoz et Roire, 1999, para. 54 and ECHR, Monnat, 
2006, para. 67. In the latest case is stated: «the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in 
relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the provision that they are acting 
in good faith and provide reliable and precise information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism». Truthfulness is a exceptio veritatis when freedom of information collides with right 
to honour but not when collides with right to privacy (ECHR, Markt Intern Verlag GmbH et Klaus 
Bermann, 1989, para. 35; ECHR, Castells, 1992, para. 48; ECHR, Mamère, 2006, para. 23). In 
this sense, the UN Special Rapporteur has said that no one should be penalized for statements 
which are true (Report, 2001, para. 12). In ECHR, Mamère, 2006, para. 24, is said that French 
government stated that exceptio veritatis, according to art. 35 Press Act, can only be used when 
facts date back to 10 years. In this case we can read: «The Government argued that the 
principle was justified by the need for the law to ensure that the reality of past events could not 
be challenged without any limit in time (...) In general terms it does see the logic behind a time 
bar of this nature, in so far as the older the events to which allegations refer, the more difficult it 
is to establish the truth of those allegations. However, where historical or scientific events are 
concerned new facts may emerge over the years that enrich the debate and improve people's 
understanding of what actually happened. ». 
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information, it will not be possible to demand truthfulness because it would be 
impossible to check and prove the facts (2001, 138). The right of research 
covers the right of citizens and journalist to seek facts and news; to access and 
to consult publics archives; to interview persons, important figures, politicians 
and public servants... This right also covers the freedom of movement since 
sometimes researching will need some travels through the country10. In this 
sense, Gérard Cohen-Jonathan asserts that the right of research is basic for 
journalists and foreign press correspondents (1989, 451). They will make a 
more frequent use of this right because they will be broadcasting news by 
traditional mass media (radio, TV, journals, newspapers) or by the new 
channels based on the Internet. Notwithstanding the importance of this right for 
journalists, it is not possible to reject citizens as holders of this right because 
they are also playing an important role in imparting information through the 
Internet.11  
 
The UN Special Rapporteur has stated that «the new technologies and, in 
particular, the Internet are inherently democratic, provide the public and 
individuals with access to information sources and enable all to participate 
actively in the communication process» (Report, 2002, para. 67). This is only 
partly true because, as Saskia Sassen suggests, electronic space is 
characterised by both power concentration and by openness and 
decentralization. Although we tend to view electronic space as characterized by 
the distribution of power and the absence of hierarchy, the Internet is also 
making other forms of power possible because the three properties of electronic 
networks (speed, simultaneity, and interconnectivity) are enjoyed by just a few 
in concentrated places: «the new information technologies have not only 
reconfigured centrality and its spatial correlates, they have also created new 
spaces for centrality» (1998, 177-178, 181)12. The widely accepted notion that 
location or agglomeration has become obsolete, now that global 
                                                 
10
 See ECHR, Piermont, 1995. 
11
 ECHR, Sunday Times, 1976, para. 65. 
12
 The UN Special Rapporteur observed that in the final phase of the World Summit of the 
Information Society, held in Tunis from 16 to 18 November 2005, there was much emphasis and 
focus on purely technical and business matters while the link between new technologies and 
human rights was almost completely neglected (Report, 2006, para. 31). In this sense, we 
should ensure that the Internet serves not only commercial interests and that commercial 
initiatives coexist with social and cultural projects. 
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telecommunication advances are allowing for maximum dispersal, is only partly 
correct because the territorial dispersal facilitated by telecommunications 
advances has redefined the concept of agglomeration. In this sense, it is 
necessary to facilitate equal participation in, access to and use of information 
and communications technology such as the Internet, and to encourage 
international cooperation aimed at the development of media and information 
and communication facilities in all countries.  
 
Nevertheless, the Internet has substantially changed the right to seek, receive 
and impart information since the frontiers have literally gone with the wind and 
this phenomenon has caused a delocation of the information. Delocation means 
that the person who broadcasts and the person who receives, and even the 
information message, are not located or agglomerated in a geographical or 
spatial point, as they were when freedom of information was exercised by 
traditional means of communication such as journals, newspapers, radio 
stations or TV channels. The Internet has had an amazing impact on changing 
the roles played by the ones who receive and who impart the information. 
Traditionally, the roles were clearly distributed but in the current situation 
everybody without discrimination whether they are journalists13, scientific 
researchers14, artists15, politicians16, members of trade unions17, citizens or 
foreigners18 has a potential capacity to impart information. Therefore every 
individual can be deemed to hold a right to seek, receive and impart information 
and ideas through a medium like the Internet about any topic, subject or issue 
and discuss any problem relating to it freely, through any media of his or her 
choice and on his or her responsibility19. 
 
                                                 
13
 ECHR Sunday Times,1976; ECHR, Sunday Times, 1979; ECHR, Lingens, 1986; ECHR, 
Observer et Guardian, 1991; ECHR, Jersild, 1994; and ECHR, Monnat, 2006, inter alia, have 
stated that freedom of information and freedom of opinion have a special relevance when 
practicing for journalists and politicians. 
14
 ECHR, Hertel, 1998, para. 50; ECHR, Baskaya et Okçuoglu, 1999; ECHR, Erdogdu et Ince, 
1999. 
15
 ECHR, Yasar, 2003. 
16
 ECHR, Brasilier, 2006; ECHR, Alinak, 2006. 
17
 ECHR, Karakoç, 2003. 
18
 ECHR, Salvation Army, 2001, para. 82. 
19
 HRC, Hertzberg et al. vs. Finland (61/79). 
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Although it could be seen as redundant because there is not a true 
communication without reception, freedom of information has an active feature 
(research and impart) and a passive feature (receive) when implementing public 
opinion. The relevance of the freedom of information is reinforced by the right to 
receive information, especially when general interest issues are disseminated20. 
It means that the state has also the duties to respect and promote the right to 
receive any information without public or private interferences21; to inform in 
some cases, for instance, danger for life, physical integrity or public health22; to 
promote the transmission of some kind of information, for instance, prevention 
and treatment of HIV/AIDS23.  
 
Imparting truthful information sets out the right to establish mass media. This 
right is contrary to the state monopoly in the media sector, which is present in 
many countries even today. It is true that there were technical conditions that 
could limit the establishment of mass media, but nowadays such conditions are 
gone because of the scientific progress and new technologies based on the 
Internet. Could states subject the establishment of new mass media based on 
the Internet to a licence? In general, formalities should be kept to a minimum 
and the prohibition of mass broadcasting without a licence may be justified as a 
measure to prevent confusion of signals and blockage of the airwaves. But due 
to technical progress, such conditions cannot be justified in numbers of 
frequencies and available channels24. Nowadays, because of the Internet, we 
have thousands of journals, radio stations, TV channels and blogs which do not 
consume any paper lot or frequency band. Therefore, it is not possible to admit 
in a democratic society a system of licence for limiting the mass media based 
on the Internet because the states have the duty to facilitate the access to 
information and to promote a pluralistic approach to information. They must 
encourage a diversity of ownership of media through, inter alia, transparent 
licensing systems and effective regulations on undue concentration of 
                                                 
20
 ECHR, Lingens, 1986; ECHR, Jersild, 1986; ECHR, Sunday Times, 1989; ECHR, Guardian 
et Observer, 1991; ECHR, Oberchlick, 1991; ECHR, Fressoz et Roire, 1999. 
21
 ECHR, Gaskin, 1989, para. 74. 
22
 ECHR, Guerra, 1998, para. 52. 
23
 Report, 2004, para. 66. 
24
 ECHR, Informationsverein Lentia, 1993, para. 39. 
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ownership of the media in the private sector (Català, 2001, 157)25 because 
«media directly run by private business corporations tend to be less impartial 
and professional than media run by an independent body such as a media 
authority or a blind trust» (Report, 2005, para. 55). 
 
What kind of information can be seeked, imparted and received? What kind of 
content can the messages have? The information covered under article 19.2 
ICCPR is not only the political information but also every form of subjective 
ideas and opinions capable of transmission to others, such as commercial news 
and information, advertisement, works of art26. Nevertheless, we can distinguish 
the information with public interest from the information with private interest. 
The former is more related to the freedom of information and freedom of 
expression than the latter (Català, 2001, 164). In this sense Gerard Cohen-
Jonathan has suggested that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
jurisprudence has established a hierarchy and on the top is the information 
concerning the common-wealth (1993,70). Such public interest is not focused 
on politics but on any matter that could have an influence on public opinion27. In 
this sense, States are, then, obliged to respect the freedom of individuals to 
seek, receive and impart information about scientific progress, «which includes 
not only natural and biological sciences, but also progress in the social sciences 
and the humanities»; to respect the application made as a result of new 
scientific insight and the right to enjoy the benefit of such progress; and «should 
actively promote the interplay of ideas and information among scientific 
researchers throughout the world» (Eide, 2001, 295, 298). In my opinion, the 
concept “human rights” is included among the progress in the social sciences 
and citizens have the right to seek, receive and impart information about human 
rights, NGO’s activities related to human rights, and the States are obliged to 
respect and promote this right. However, we must admit that it is difficult to say 
a priori what matters have a public interest. As we have seen, they will be 
identified through a free discussion between different stances. 
 
                                                 
25
 ECHR, Groppera Radio, 1990; ECHR, Informationsverein Lentia, 1993. 
26
 HRC, Ballantyne et al. vs. Canada (359, 385/89); ECHR, Groppera, 1990, para. 55. 
27
 ECHR, Thorgeir Thorgeirson, 1992; ECHR, Karhuvaara, 2004, para. 44-45; ECHR, Baskaya 
et Okçuoglu, 1999, para. 62. 
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Artistic messages, which are also covered by the freedom of expression, 
deserve special attention because offense can be caused by what is said as 
well as by the manner in which the opinion is expressed. Information and 
opinion can be expressed by word, symbolic language, photographs, paints, 
stills, plays, drawing and caricatures (Report, 2007, para. 22-37)28. Those who 
create, play, propagate or exhibit any work of art contribute to the essential 
exchange of ideas and opinions within a democratic society. From which it can 
be deduced that states have an obligation to no encroach unduly upon freedom 
of expression29. Artists and promoters certainly have special duties, 
responsibilities and limits. In this sense, it is interesting to remember the case of 
the Danish cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad having horns, wearing a 
headdress in the shape of a bomb and proclaiming that suicide bombers had 
depleted the supply of virgins used to reward martyrs, and how the Internet 
extended the offence around the world, making the cartoons accessible to all 
Muslims. This case has been analysed by the UN Special Rapporteur in his 
2007 Report and concluded that «The exercise of freedom of expression by 
media professionals demands good judgement, rationality and a sense of 
responsibility. Insulting religions, deep-rooted beliefs and ethnic identities 
through the use of stereotypes and labelling is not conducive to creating an 
enabling environment for a constructive and peaceful dialogue among different 
communities. Polarization based on distorted arguments can spread ethnic and 
religious hatred thus endangering delicate social and cultural balances, which 
are the results of relentless efforts to consolidate a harmonious multicultural 
society» (para. 69). In my opinion, the scope of freedom of information will also 
depend on the medium used and any democratic society can support legal 
interventions if they are undertaken, in order to protect religious and political 
sensibilities from outrage by a public act. In this sense, we could admit the legal 
interventions and the punishment of the offender through a balancing test in 
which the seriousness of the offense must be weighed against the 
reasonableness of the offending conduct (Feinberg, 1985, 35-44).  It is not 
possible to argue for the good of such cartoons by drawing on the importance of 
                                                 
28
 ECHR, Müller, 1988, para. 27. 
29
 ECHR, Müller, 1988, para. 33. 
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free expression because when we balance the seriousness and the 
reasonableness, we find that the result is profoundly offensive. 
 
Regarding the medium in which the message is spread, there is not any 
restriction and all forms of the media, including the print media, radio, television 
and the Internet are important in the exercise, promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression30. It is interesting to observe that 
some media have more impact than others. The potential impact of the medium 
concerned is an important factor and this can have some effect on the limits of 
the freedom of information31. We could express, however, little reluctance when 
freedom of expression is exercised through a non-conventional medium as 
pamphlets or libellous. In this sense, we could ask if the Internet is one of them. 
Once and for all, the answer is negative32. Although article 19.2 ICCPR does 
not make any reference to the Internet, it is an article with an open normative 
clause by saying that information and ideas can be seeked, received and 
imparted through any media. This kind of clause is the most suitable when we 
have to deal with scientific progress. From such a clause we can assert that the 
Internet is included in article 19.2 ICCPR. The global development caused by 
the Internet, on the other hand, proves that the “regardless frontiers” mention is 
real. Moreover, the interplay of ideas and information among scientific 
researchers throughout the world is now possible and «vital to the healthy 
development of science and technology» (Eide, 2001, 298).  
 
The promotion of the right to seek, receive and impart information through the 
Internet is costly for States, first, because of the infrastructure requirements, as 
Sassen suggested, which need an enormous amount of money. The levels of 
technical development depend on public and privates economic resources and 
for this reason «we are seeing a spatialization of inequality evident both in the 
geography of the communications infrastructure and in the emergent 
geographies in electronic space itself» (Sassen, 1998, 182). Second, the 
interrelation and interdependence of human rights are illustrated by the 
                                                 
30
 ECHR, Jersild, 1986, para. 31. 
31
 See ECHR, Pedersen et Baadsgaard, 2004, para. 79. 
32
 We should discuss if some informations on pirates websites and opinions on no modulate 
blogs are covered by the freedom of expression. 
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connection between high rates of illiteracy, especially among women, and 
unequal access to education for girls and boys, women and men, and the full 
enjoyment of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Moreover, the 
promotion of this right must include, among others, a gender perspective 
because sometimes we forget that women are the fifty percent of the world 
population and promoting women’s rights is of utmost significance. The aim is to 
facilitate equal participation in, access to and use of, information and 
communications technology such as the Internet. The increasing international 
focus on human rights has contributed to raising awareness in regard to some 
specific human right problems faced by women. Despite the legal rules 
enshrining the principle of equality, women’s rights have had a marginal role 
within the human right discourse and there is incapacity or unwillingness to pay 
suitable attention to gender specific topics in the actual application of human 
rights (Byrnes, 1992; Gallagher, 1997). In this sense, the principle of equality as 
differentiation and the principle of non-discrimination should be guaranteed 
through legal rules and policies in order to face both direct discrimination and 
indirect discrimination. Katarina Frostell and Martin Scheinin suggest that both 
kinds of discrimination can play a crucial role in order to develop a gender 
sensitive interpretation of the human rights issues (2001, 335-336) and they 
propose the adoption of the indirect discrimination principle in order to cover all 
the «unreasonable differential treatment based on gender neutral ground which 
affects, proportionately, more women than men» (2001, 337). 
 
The latest issue of this epigraph is who rules over the Internet. Here we have 
two options. The first one is a libertarian solution based on a private non-profit 
corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assignated Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), that has so far allocated Internet domain names on a purely technical 
basis and that has no control over the content. The second one, supported by 
the current UN Special Rapporteur, is to establish «an intergovernmental 
organization on Internet governance» in order to deal with «the proliferation, 
through worldwide availability of Internet resources, of websites that could 
increase the phenomena of child pornography and prostitution, the sexual 
exploitation of women, racial discrimination, xenophobia, hat speech and similar 
human rights violations» (Report, 2006, para. 38). In January 2007 the UN 
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Special Rapporteur underlined with his statement that: «The creation of an 
international organization, which would govern Internet with a firm human rights 
approach, is a priority for the United Nations (...) Such an organization will 
develop and apply, through the joint work of relevant national agencies, the 
private sector and civil society, shared principles, norms, rules, which will shape 
the evolution and the use of the Internet» (Report, 2007, para. 38). 
 
4. Limits to the right to seek, receive and impart information through the 
Internet. 
If we do not want to have a naïve discourse when dealing with human rights, we 
have to be aware of their limits. Limitation means that certain actions are 
excluded from the protection circle each human right provides to the rightholder. 
In our case, for instance, access to some kind of information is not included in 
the right to seek, receive and impart information through the Internet (child 
pornography or spreading hate information). Nevertheless, the existence of 
human rights limits cannot be seen as a carte blanche in the hands of the State 
because the limits are, at the same time, limited since it is not possible to 
subject human right to such restrictions that jeopardize its exercise or 
protection. As stated in the Siracusa Principles, «the scope of a limitation (...) 
shall not be interpreted so as to jeopardize the essence of the right concerned» 
(2)33. The limits of the freedom of expression and freedom of information are not 
the rule but the exceptions, which are to be construed strictly and only 
convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom34. 
So, the form of censorship and surveillance some governments are adopting in 
order to block access to aspects of the Internet and to monitor email traffic is 
not justified because it jeopardizes the essence of the freedom of information. 
 
Moreover, sometimes we are not talking about limitation but delimitation. 
Delimitation basically means interpretation. Delimitation is an internal limit 
posed by the Constitution or derived from the interdependence of human rights; 
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 Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogation of Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were adopted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (Economic and Social Council, United Nations) in 
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 ECHR, Church of Scientiology Moscow, 2007, para. 86. 
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on the contrary, limitation is an external limit posed by one normative authority 
with legal competence, according to the Constitution, and it means to 
enumerate the actions not covered by the human right35. 
 
How can the freedom of access to information on the Internet be limited? 
Generally speaking, it can be said that there was an aspiration to set up a 
rigorous system of restrictions because we are dealing with a right that can be 
subject to only a few restrictions but such aspiration is attenuated for the 
diversity of objectives which allow to limit the freedom of information and for the 
HRC and ECHR margin of discretion and margin of appreciation jurisprudence 
(Lezertua, 1993, 368). These margins can only be accepted with an iuris tantum 
presumption on the decency of the states, which, as we know, has a variable 
geometry. 
 
The system of limits is composed of two general principles (prescribed by law, 
and necessary in a democratic society) and four specific objectives (harm to 
others, offence to others, national security and public morals). However, in any 
case, no person can be subject to prior censorship36. 
 
5.1. General Principles 
5.1.1. Prescribed by Law 
The first general principle is the rule of law. It means that the limit is to be 
established in a legal rule which must be in force at the time the limitation is 
applied37 . The legal rule has a material meaning so the limits can be 
established in an act, a subordinated rule or a judicial decision38. The 
administration internal rules are excluded, except if they can be known by the 
                                                 
35
 ECHR, Çetin, 2003, para. 60-61: «Il n'est pas possible de concilier cette disposition [qui 
prévoit l'impossibilité de procéder à un contrôle juridictionnel des actes émanant du préfet de la 
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 ECHR, Kruslin, 1990, para. 29. 
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 ECHR, Huvig, 1990, para. 28; ECHR, Kruslin, 1990, para. 29; ECHR, Cantoni, 1996, para. 
29; ECHR, Baskaya y Okçuoglu, 1999, para. 36. 
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citizens. The legal rule can be written or can be part of a non-written legal 
system, so the Common Law and traditional rules are included39. Obviously, the 
rule of law principle tries to seek foreseeability and accessibility because 
citizens have to be able to adapt their behaviour and to foresee the 
consequences of their actions40. The scope of the notion of foreseeability 
depends on the text, the issue and the persons addressed41. The rule of law 
combats arbitrariness not discretionality42. Last, the rules have to be 
understandable, avoiding generic or vague legal formulations43 and broadly 
worded justifications44. This requirement must be maximized when dealing with 
criminal laws45. In this sense, the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege praevia 
principle demands the crime will be defined clearly by the Law. It means that 
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any person, with or without legal assistance, has to be able to know from the 
text of the law the actions and omissions which are forbidden46. The principle 
demands that the criminal law can not be imposed by analogy but, no matter 
how clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an inevitable element of 
judicial interpretation47. 
 
5.1.2. Necessary in a democratic society. 
The second general principle means that because of the relevance of freedom 
of information in a democratic society, the necessity of the limit must be proved 
by the state. We can say that the limitation of any human right is necessary in a 
democratic society if it responds to an urgent social need for pursuing a 
legitimate aim and it is in proportion48. Such necessity can be stated proving 
there were not alternative measures with lower intensity and similar effects49. 
The word “necessary” imports an element of proportionality because the law 
must be appropriated and adapted to achieve one of the ends enumerated 
(Joseph, Schultz & Castan, 2004, 525). However, it is necessary to review the 
States limiting decisions because, though we might presuppose that the States 
exercise their discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith, we must look at 
the interference in the light of a particular case as a whole and determine 
whether it was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the 
reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and 
sufficient. In so doing, we are checking whether the national authorities are 
applying standards which are in conformity with the basic principles embodied 
in ICCPR and in ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights) and, moreover, that their decisions are based on an acceptable 
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assessment of the relevant facts50. As said in the Siracusa Principles, 
“necessary” implies that the limitation responds to a pressing public or social 
need, pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate to that aim (9). Moreover, 
«the expression “in a democratic society” shall be interpreted as imposing a 
further restriction on the limitation clauses it qualifies» (19) and «the burden is 
upon a state imposing limitations so qualified to demonstrate that the limitations 
do not impair the democratic functioning of the society» (20)51. 
 
5.2. Specific Objectives 
Art. 19.3 ICCPR allows limitations to the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas. The exercise of this freedom comes with special duties 
and responsibilities and for this reason certain restrictions are permitted. The 
limits may relate either to the interest of other persons of the community as a 
whole. In paragraph 3 we can read that the restrictions must be provided by law 
and must be necessary for (i) the respect of the rights and reputations of other, 
and (ii) for the protection of national security, public order, public health or 
public morals. 
 
5.2.1. Harm to Others. 
Harming others by seeking and imparting information through the Internet is an 
important limit of the freedom of expression. An act of harming is one which 
causes harm to people. The word “harm”, as Joel Feinberg states, «is both 
vague and ambiguous, so if we are to use the harm principle to good effect, we 
must specify more clearly how harm is to be understood» (1984, 31-32). In this 
sense, Feinberg suggests a normative sense «which the term must bear in any 
plausible formulation of the harm principle. To say that A has harmed B in this 
sense is to say much the same thing as that A has wronged B, or treated him 
unjustly. One person wrongs another when his indefensible (unjustifiable and 
inexcusable) conduct violates the other’s right» (1984, 32). 
 
5.2.2. Offence to Others. 
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It is necessary to distinguish “harm to others” and “offence to others” because 
offence is surely a less serious thing than harm (Feinberg, 1985, 2, 25)52. The 
word ‘offence’ also has a normative sense that includes those states only when 
caused by the wrongful or right violating conduct of others. It is necessary to 
determinate who are the victims with genuine grievances and attribute to them a 
right to complain against identified wrongdoers about the way in which they 
have been treated. In this sense, defamation is an intentional false 
communication that injures another person’s reputation without consent53. 
Slander and libel are two forms of defamation. The first one is a defamatory 
statement expressed in oral form, while libel is written. In order to to regain 
balance, it will be necessary to weight the seriousness of the offence. Joel 
Feinberg suggests the following standards: (i) the magnitude of the offence, 
which is a function of its intensity, duration and extent; (ii) the reasonable 
avoidability; (iii) the volenti maxim; (iv) the discounting of abnormal 
susceptibilities (Feinberg, 1985, 35).  
 
Notwithstanding the necessity to address this issue, there are abundant 
reasons for being extremely cautious in applying the offence principle because 
there are at least six different classes of offended states that can be caused by 
the blameable conduct of others and some of them are not a good reason to 
support a human right limitation (affronts to senses; disgust and revulsion; 
shock to moral, religious or patriotic sensibilities; shame, embarrassment 
(including vicarious embarrassment) and anxiety; annoyance, boredom and 
frustration; fear, resentment, humiliation and anger) (Feinberg, 1985, 10-14). 
 
5.2.3. Public order and national security 
Concerning public order and national security, they may be defined, according 
to the Siracusa Principles, as «the sum of rules which ensure the peaceful and 
effective functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on which 
society is founded» (22). Public order and national security limits on article 19 
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 Against this position see Schauer, 1993. 
53
 ECHR, Brasilier, 2006, para. 41: «les limites de la critique admissible sont plus larges à 
l’égard d’un homme politique, visé en cette qualité, que d’un simple particulier : à la différence 
du second, le premier s’expose inévitablement et consciemment à un contrôle attentif de ses 
faits et gestes tant par les journalistes que par la masse des citoyens ; il doit, par conséquent, 
montrer une plus grande tolérance».  
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ICCPR rights include prohibitions on seek, receive and impart information which 
may incite crime, violence or mass panic (Joseph, Schultz & Castan, 2004, 530) 
and are also taken «to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial 
integrity or political independence against force or threat of force»54. It is a must 
to prove that the information is a serious and real threat to national security or 
causes a damage to the order necessary to national survival55. Moreover, the 
State must specify the precise nature of the threat. In this sense, the country’s 
political context is just an indirect justification of the restriction of rights included 
in art. 19 ICCPR56. Although it is often argued that some nations, by virtue of 
their cultural or political difference, should be permitted to ‘postpone’ or 
‘redefine’ their obligations to respect certain political rights, this theory must be 
denied because there is no cultural or political exception that could justify 
human rights restrictions. In this sense, we must be reluctant to allow 
restrictions on freedom of expression and access to information for the purpose 
of national security and public order, at least in the absence of detailed 
justifications57.  
 
National security and public order are perhaps the limitations which are most 
often abused; they are often invoked to protect the elite position of the 
government of the day, rather than to truly protect the rights of a State’s 
population (Joseph, Schultz & Castan, 2004, 540). In this sense, searching 
information about human rights or NGO activities is not a danger for national 
security, public order and public morality58. “Human rights” per se cannot be 
included in the banned content because it would mean to distort the whole 
human rights philosophy59. In this sense, we can read in the Siracusa 
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 Siracusa Principles, 29; In ECHR, Stoll, 2006, para. 49-52 is discussed the public interest 
certain information classified as “confidential” may have for public opinion. 
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 HRC, Kim v Republic of Korea (574/94), para. 12.4; ECHR, Hadjianastassiou, 1992, para. 44-
47. In this case is stated that due to the special conditions attaching to military life and the 
specific “duties” and “responsibilities” incumbent on the members of the armed forces, they are 
bound by an obligation of discretion in relation to anything concerning the performance of his 
duties. 
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 HCR, Mukong vs. Cameroon (458/91). 
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 HRC, Sohn v Republic of Korea, 518/92: «The state party has failed to specify the precise 
nature of the threat». 
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 Siracusa Principles, 22. 
59
 HRC, Kivenmaa vs Finland, 412/90: «The right of an individual to express his political 
opinions, including obviously his opinions on the question of human rights, forms part of the 
freedom of expression guaranteed by article 19 of the Covenant». HRC, Kim vs. Republic of 
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Principles, «the systematic violation of human rights undermines true national 
security and may jeopardize international peace and security. A state 
responsible for such violations shall not invoke national security as a 
justification for measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such violation or at 
perpetrating repressive practices against its population» (32). 
 
Special attention deserves to be given in the cases in which we argue over the 
limits to the freedom of information when ideologies or undemocratic ideas such 
as Nazism, Stalinism, racism, terrorism60 or religious fundamentalism are the 
content of the information61. In this particular case, we have to take into account 
the letter and spirit of article 20.2 ICCPR: «Any advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence 
shall be prohibited by law». It is crucial that the dissemination of authoritarian 
                                                                                                                                               
Korea, 574/94, no State may submit that it is illegal to produce, distribute or receive information 
that praise and promote human rights. HRC, Mukong vs Cameroon, 458/91: «The legitimate 
objective of safeguarding and indeed strengthening national unity under difficult political 
circumstances cannot be achieved by attempting to muzzle advocacy of multi-party democracy, 
democratic tenets and human rights». 
60
 In the case of terrorism, after September 11th 2001, some governments have adopted 
national security legislation to limit freedom of information on the ground that the work of the 
media will support, either directly or indirectly, terrorist activities (Report, 2006, para. 71). When 
some ideas or values such as terrorism communicado are imparted, it is necessary to adopt 
precautions for dispelling any ambiguity and not becoming apologist. In this sense, it is 
necessary to examine with precaution the publication of opinions by leaders of organizations 
that resort to force against the state (ECHR, Jersild, 1986, para. 31-34; ECHR, Zana, 1997, 
para. 58; ECHR, Erdogdu et Ince, 1999, para. 54; ECHR, Küçük, 2002, para. 38-41). In Jersild 
ECHR states: «Taken as a whole, the feature could not objectively have appeared to have as its 
purpose the propagation of racist views and ideas. On the contrary, it clearly sought - by means 
of an interview - to expose, analyse and explain this particular group of youths, limited and 
frustrated by their social situation, with criminal records and violent attitudes, thus dealing with 
specific aspects of a matter that already then was of great public concern (...) Both the TV 
presenter’s introduction and the applicant’s conduct during the interviews clearly dissociated 
him from the persons interviewed, for example by describing them as members of “a group of 
extremist youths” who supported the Ku Klux Klan and by referring to the criminal records of 
some of them. The applicant also rebutted some of the racist statements for instance by 
recalling that there were black people who had important jobs. It should finally not be forgotten 
that, taken as a whole, the filmed portrait surely conveyed the meaning that the racist 
statements were part of a generally anti-social attitude of the Greenjackets. Admittedly, the item 
did not explicitly recall the immorality, dangers and unlawfulness of the promotion of racial 
hatred and of ideas of superiority of one race. However, in view of the above-mentioned 
counterbalancing elements and the natural limitations on spelling out such elements in a short 
item within a longer programme as well as the journalist’s discretion as to the form of expression 
used, the Court does not consider the absence of such precautionary reminders to be relevant». 
In Erdogdu et Ince, Judge Bonello says: «I believe that punishment by the national authorities of 
those encouraging violence would be justifiable in a democratic society only if the incitement 
were such as to create “a clear and present danger”. When the invitation to the use of force is 
intellectualised, abstract, and removed in time and space from the foci of actual or impending 
violence, then the fundamental right to freedom of expression should generally prevail.». 
61
 On that list can be included any no democratic political ideology. 
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ideologies and fundamentalist ideas is to be proscribed for the sake of 
democracy. In this sense, article 5 ICCPR is quite clear because it prohibits 
interpretation of the ICCPR in such a way so as to grant rights for people to 
engage in activities aimed at the destruction or limitation of the ICCPR rights 
(Joseph, Schultz & Castan, 2004, 534)62. 
 
5.2.4. Public Morals. 
The purpose of the prohibition of some information based on public morals tries 
to reflect and enforce the prevailing moral conceptions within the State as 
interpreted by the Parliament and by large groups of population63. When we are 
dealing with public morality, we have to take into account it is an ambiguous 
and vague concept which Courts have tried to outline through their sentences 
but with no satisfactory results. The ICCPR is generally enunciated in a 
universal language but it caters for some cultural differences because of the 
existence of public morals as a limit to certain rights. As Sarah Joseph, Jenny 
Schultz and Melissa Castan state, «the uncertainty entailed in ICCPR limitations 
introduces flexibility to human rights interpretation, and generates ideological 
and cultural debate over the content of human rights guarantees» (2004, 43). 
So, the ICCPR could be interpreted in a relativist way because public morals 
differ widely in space and time, and there is no universally applicable common 
standard. One indication that ICCPR can be interpreted in a relativist way is that 
the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the ECHR said that a certain margin 
of discretion or margin of appreciation must be accorded to the responsible 
national authorities: «The Court considers it quite natural that the national 
authorities, whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider, within the 
limits of their jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole, should enjoy a 
wide margin of appreciation when they are asked to make rulings on such 
matters. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of 
their countries, the national authorities are in principle better placed than an 
international court to evaluate local needs and conditions»64. In this sense, it is 
stated in the Siracusa Principles that the States, «while enjoying a certain 
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 See also art. 4 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
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 HRC, Hertzberg et al. V Finland (61/79), para. 6.1. 
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 ECHR, Fretté, 1997, para. 41; HRC, Hertzberg et al. V Finland (61/79), para. 10.3.;  
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margin of discretion, shall demonstrate that the limitation in question is essential 
to the maintenance of respect to fundamental values of the community» (27). 
 
In my opinion, if we accept the theory of the margin of discretion, we are 
opening the door to an unacceptable restriction on human rights. The margin of 
discretion means that public morals can be seen as an acceptable limit on 
human rights and we will be accepting moral relativism because we are not 
defending a true morality but we are defending a particular social morality as an 
instrument for society self-protection (Ramiro Avilés, 2006). If we want to know 
what morality is, we must not ask  the rational man but the reasonable man. So, 
we are not really caring about moral content or principles of justice but only for 
social cohesion what, in my opinion, may be a real danger for human rights 
because such a doctrine dilutes human rights protection. However, «since the 
Toonen decision in 1994, the HRC has clearly exhibited its disapproval of the 
culturally relativist argument» (Joseph, Schultz & Castan, 2004, 43)65. Stressing 
the diversity of cultural or moral value runs counter to the major thrust of human 
rights thinking in the world today, which holds the universality of human rights to 
be the basic underpinning of the international human rights building 
(Stavenhagen, 2001, 93). Those theories and legal text which admit social 
morality as a valid limit for human rights are not taking them seriously and are 
distorting the sense and meaning of human rights. It is true that societies have 
different moral values but this fact cannot be used to justify the limitation of 
human rights but only to describe how society is. 
 
Conclusion 
Protecting and promoting freedom of opinion and expression on the Internet, 
and other communications media, is a central challenge for the future. The 
realization of a non-discriminatory global information society may represent a 
leap forward for humankind, opening new paths for human and economic 
development. If the information society misses the opportunity to make 
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 The margin of appreciation has been rejected in relation to other ICCPR rights in HRC, 
Länsman v Finland (511/92), para. 9.4. See also EHCR, Open Door and Dublin Well Woman, 
1992, para. 68. 
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technologies available globally, the social and economic gap between Northern 
and Southern countries will become deeper than in the past. 
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